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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD M. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920239-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(f) , Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended. 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the Appellant was entrapped to commit the 
offense for which he was convicted. The standard of review is that 
if reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence of entrapment 
should necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the Appellant's 
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. State v. Kourbelas, 621 
P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980). 
2. Whether Rule 608(b) of the Rules of Evidence pro-
hibits the testimony of a witness that an undercover police officer 
used illegal drugs during the time the officer was investigating 
the Appellant, where the officer had testified on cross-examination 
that she did not use illegal drugs during that time. The standard 
of review is whether the trial court's ruling excluding this evi-
dence constituted error affecting a substantial right of the 
Appellant, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a); State v. Tuc-
ker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990) n.l at 821. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7: No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12: In criminal pro-
secutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by coun-
sel , to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy there-
of, to testify in his own behalf, to be con-
fronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the.county or district in which the of-
fense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. . . . 
STATUTES 
§76-2-303(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953): It 
is a defense that the actor was entrapped into 
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs 
when a law enforcement officer or a person di-
rected by or acting in cooperation with the 
officer induces the commission of an offense 
in order to obtain evidence of the commission 
for prosecution by methods creating a sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be com-
mitted by one not otherwise ready to commit 
it. Conduct merely affording a person an op-
portunity to commit an offense does not con-
stitute entrapment. 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 608(b): Specific 
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting his cre-
dibility, other than conviction of a crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by ex-
trinsic evidence. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction based 
on a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of distribution of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of 
§58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 
Appellant was charged with two counts of distributing 
cocaine. At a pretrial hearing on Appellant's assertion of the 
defense of entrapment, the trial judge ruled that, as a matter of 
law, Appellant was not entrapped into commission of the offenses 
(R. 60). The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict 
of not guilty as to one count and guilty as to the other. Appel-
lant was sentenced to the statutory prison term, but was placed on 
probation on conditions including fines, restitution and serving 
75 days in jail. This appeal followed. 
The pretrial hearing on entrapment was heard on the same day 
as that in another case involving the same witnesses and coun-
sel. The transcript of the entrapment hearing in this case does 
not include the trial judge's findings on the record. However, 
the transcript of the entrapment hearing in the other case (State 
v. LeVasseur) does contain the trial court's oral findings in this 
case. The pertinent pages of that transcript are included in the 
appendix to this brief. 
Statement of Facts 
I. The Police Conduct 
Officer Anne Burchett met Appellant at a Cedar City 
bar in November of 19 9 0 (T. 63). Burchett was working as an 
undercover narcotics agent, attempting to establish social rela-
tionships in order to obtain drugs (T. 130). At this first meet-
ing, the two made plans that she would later come to his home for 
dinner (ET. 12). When they got together at Appellantfs house, he 
cooked dinner for her (ET. 13) and they sat in front of the fire-
place (T. 94), where Appellant asked Burchett if she used cocaine. 
She said that she did (T. 65). During the conversation in front 
of the fire, Burchett mentioned that at her house she had some 
firewood that needed chopping (T. 9 5). A short while later, Ap-
pellant came to her house and chopped the wood (ET. 14). She 
made coffee and invited him in (ET. 15), and when he left, Ap-
pellant kissed her (T. 103; ET. 26). Some time before Christmas, 
they spent two or three hours together driving around the Cedar 
City area in Appellant's truck looking at Christmas lights (T. 67, 
97; ET. 16). 
On May 8, 1991, Appellant invited Burchett to his home 
after she finished work (PT. 6), and after some conversation in the 
kitchen, Burchett told him that as a bartender she knew a lot of 
people at her place of work who were looking for cocaine (T. 67; 
PT. 30). Appellant told Burchett that he would get the cocaine for 
The record includes three transcripts, designated in this brief 
as follows: Trial ("T."), Pretrial Entrapment Hearing ("ET."), 
and Preliminary Hearing ("PT."). 
her in Las Vegas, where the two went in Burchett1s car on May 10, 
1991 (T. 69). Burchett had told Appellant she didn't have the 
money to buy the drugs, so Appellant loaned her the necessary 
$350.00, which Burchett later paid back (ET. 33; T. 109). Ap-
pellant got the cocaine and gave it to Burchett when they re-
turned to her house in Hamilton Fort (PT. 12). 
After the first drug transaction, Appellant and Burchett 
continued their relationship, exchanging phone calls (ET. 19) and 
meeting at a bar (PT. 22). At one point, Burchett left a message 
on Appellant's answering machine asking him why he hadn't stopped 
by to pick her up on his way to go water skiing, since she wanted 
to go with him to the lake (T. 104). Some time before July 29, 
1991, the two went on a date to Mesquite, Nevada to have dinner and 
to gamble, Appellant paying for the dinner and drinks (T. 105, 
163; ET. 24). Burchett concedes that this date may have been at 
her suggestion (ET. 25) . 
On July 26, 1991 Appellant asked Burchett if she wanted 
to get more cocaine to sell (T. 78), and, after arranging with her 
supervisors to get the money, Burchett called Appellant back and 
told him yes. The two originally planned that Burchett would 
again accompany Appellant to Las Vegas to get the drugs(ET. 21), 
but, being unable to arrange details with her supervisors, Bur-
chett told Appellant at the last instant that her parents had been 
in an automobile accident in Salt Lake City, and that she had to 
go there instead (T. 81). Burchett took Appellant the agreed sum 
of $750.00, leaving it with him at his house, and telling him she 
was on her way to Salt Lake City (T. 82). On July 29, 1991, Ap-
pellant phoned Burchett, telling her he'd gotten the cocaine in 
Las Vegas, and arranging for her to pick it up at his house on 
that day (T. 8 4). 
Agent Burchett was operating in a system where there 
were no written rules or policies governing the conduct of under-
cover agents (T. 151) , and where it was considered important and 
necessary for her to develop close personal relationships with 
people in order to buy drugs (T. 161) . Although she made written 
reports detailing actual drug transactions, she did not consider 
it important to make written reports about all the other contacts 
she had with Appellant when drugs were not discussed or transacted 
(T. 100, 101)
 f including kissing, holding hands (PT. 34), discus-
sing religion (T. 98) and personal phone calls between the two 
in which drugs were not mentioned (ET. 20). Agent Burchett1s 
conduct as an undercover officer was governed only by the personal 
opinions of her supervisor Garth Wilkinson as to the propriety of 
her behavior (T. 151-154) and by her own "common sense" (T. 90); 
she was so unfettered that on one occasion she engaged in sexual 
intercourse with a "target defendant," (T. 119) who was subsequently 
not prosecuted (T. 126) . 
II. The Disputed Trial Testimony 
During cross-examination agent Burchett denied using 
illegal drugs in the course of her investigation of Appellant 
(T. 112). The defense produced a witness, Jeff Farr, who was 
prepared to testify that he knew agent Anne Burchett intimately 
during the time she was working on Appellant's case, and that 
Burchett used cocaine and marijuana with the witness on several 
occasions (T. 133). Farr was also prepared to testify that he was 
familiar with the effects of illegal drugs, and that on many oc-
casions he observed Burchett to be under the influence of the drugs 
they used together, inconsistent with Burchett's only having simu-
lated the use of the drugs (T. 134). The prosecutor objected to 
the admission of this testimony on the ground that it was prohi-
bited by Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 134), and 
the trial judge sustained the objection, ruling the proferred tes-
timony inadmissible (T. 141). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The conduct of the police in procuring drugs from 
the Appellant was entrapment within the meaning of §76-2-303(1), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 1973. The evidence 
establishes as a matter of law that Anne Burchett induced the com-
mission of the offenses by methods creating a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. Reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence should 
necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the Appellant's guilt. 
2. The trial judge incorrectly excluded the testimony 
of defense witness Jeff Farr under Rule 608 (b). The testimony was 
admissible as impeachment of agent Anne Burchett. The exclusion of 
the testimony was a denial of Appellant's right to due process and 
to present witnesses in his defense, in violation of Utah Const, 
art. I, §7 and §12. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE POLICE CONDUCT IN PROCURING DRUGS FROM APPELLANT 
WAS ENTRAPMENT. 
The defense of entrapment set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-303(1) (1977) embodies an objective standard, focusing 
the inquiry to the nature of the police conduct: 
"Under the objective view of entrapment, 
the focus is not on the propensities 
and predisposition of the specific de-
fendant, but on whether the police con-
duct falls below standards to which 
common feelings respond, for the pro-
per use of government power. This con-
cept establishes entrapment on its his-
torical basis, the refusal to counte-
nance a perversion of justice by go-
vernment misconduct. The objective 
view provides a solid definitive 
standard upon which the defense can 
rest, i.e., does the conduct of the 
government comport with a fair and 
honorable administration of justice?" 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1979) at 500. 
In each entrapment case the propriety of the induce-
ment by the police is measured by its probable effect on a hypo-
thetical person in the setting in which the inducement took 
place. State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987). Every 
case in which the defense is raised must be carefully examined 
on its own facts, State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), 
and the Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the very circumstan-
ces in this case may go beyond the proper exercise of the govern-
ment1 s power: 
"Extreme pleas of desperate illness or 
appeals based primarily on sympathy, 
pity, or close personal friendship, or 
offers of inordinate sums of money, 
are examples, depending on an eval-
uation of the circumstances in each 
case, of what might constitute prohi-
bited police conduct. In evaluating 
the course of conduct between the 
government representative and the de-
fendant, the transactions leading up 
to the offense, the interaction be-
tween the agent and the defendant, 
and the response to the inducements 
of the agent, are all to be consi-
dered in judging what the effect of 
the government agent's conduct would 
be on a normal person." Taylor, 599 
P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). 
Agent Burchett's procurement of drugs from Appellant 
resulted from an appeal based primarily on the close personal 
friendship the two shared. When she initiated the first drug 
transaction on May 8, 1991 by telling Appellant that her friends 
were looking for cocaine (T. 108), she and Appellant, after ha-
ving met initially at a bar, had shared a dinner for two at his 
house; he had come to her house and chopped wood for her, drunk 
coffee in her kitchen, and kissed her. They had spent a few hours 
together riding in Appellant's truck around Cedar City looking at 
the Christmas lights, and had phone conversations unrelated to 
drug transactions (T. 104). They had, in Burchett's own words, 
established a "social relationship" (T. 130) in which she had 
gained his "trust and confidence" (T. 128), a relationship upon 
which she clearly relied when she initiated the first transaction. 
In the language of Taylor these transactions leading up to the 
first offense, the interaction between Burchett and Appellant, 
and his response to her inducements point inescapably to the 
conclusion that Burchett's conduct created a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. 
While the evidence in this case does not involve a 
sexual relationship between Appellant and agent Burchett [as, for 
example in Taylor and in State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 
1975)], the male-female aspect cannot be ignored, and the fact 
that Burchett is a woman is absolutely vital in considering the 
effect of her friendship with Appellant. The intimate dinner he 
cooked for her at his home, the nighttime car ride to look at the 
Christmas lights, and the favor of chopping wood are not events 
which normally transpire between mere friends of the same sex. 
This was a dating relationship despite Burchett's attempts to 
deny that fact (PT. 33), and during the trial even she became 
resigned to the proposition that her contacts with Appellant, 
such as the pleasure trip to Mesquite, Nevada, were "dates" 
(T. 105). And although she made some distinction between his 
kissing her and her kissing him (T. 103), Appellant's motivation 
was obviously one of affection. Burchett regarded the social 
aspects of the relationship as unimportant (T. 101), but these 
events are at the core of entrapment: 
"The government, once employing an 
undercover agent, cannot choose to 
select those actions of the infor-
mer which are beneficial to its 
case, and refuse to be responsible 
for the total conduct of its agent 
while engaged in the deception." 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 751 
(Utah 1975) (Maughan, J. dissenting). 
Burchett's total conduct in this case falls far below the proper 
use of governmental power, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 
369, 382 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and is completely 
contrary to the fair and honorable administration of justice. 
She clearly "capitalized on a special relationship," State v. 
Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987), appealing to the 
friendship she had established with the Appellant, stepping 
entirely beyond the limits on permissible police activity in an 
advanced society. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 502 (Utah 1979). 
The relationship between Burchett and Appellant was significantly 
more intimate than that between the agent and defendant in State 
v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), a case in which the Utah 
Supreme Court, affirming the trial judge's ruling that the defen-
dant had been entrapped by the female officer, commented: 
"Clearly, the defendant saw more in her 
than a business relationship. Why didn't 
the police send in a male officer? Or 
an unattractive female police officer? 
The answer is clear from the relation-
ship which developed." 734 P.2d at 468. 
This case must be distinguished from State v. Wynia, 
754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), in which two undercover females 
had only two contacts with the defendant, each occasion resulting 
in the defendant's sale of drugs to the agents. These meetings 
were in a public bowling alley/lounge and in a second lounge, and, 
except for an agent buying the defendant drinks, nothing else 
other than the drug transactions took place between the agents 
and the defendant. This Court found no entrapmentf ruling that 
the police conduct was consistent with the fair and honorable 
administration of justice. 754 P.2d at 670. The relationship 
between Appellant and Burchett, however, had progressed far beyond 
the superficial contacts this Court approved in Wynia; by the time 
the drug transactions took place, they had spent many hours alone 
together, establishing at least a close personal friendship which 
had many of the elements of a romance. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLU-
DING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS JEFF FARR. 
I. Statutory and Decisional Law 
The trial judge ruled that the testimony of Jeff Farr 
was inadmissible as a "specific instance of the conduct" of agent 
Anne Burchett and therefore unprovable by extrinsic evidence with-
in the prohibition of Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Because the witness Anne Burchett had in her trial testimony denied 
that she had used illegal drugs during her investigation of Ap-
pellant1 s case, Jeff Farr's proffered testimony that he had per-
sonally observed Burchett to use and be under the influence of il-
legal drugs during that time directly impeached the testimony of 
agent Burchett. Even if his testimony was otherwise prohibited by 
Rule 608(b), it was nonetheless admissible impeachment of Burchett: 
"In accordance with Rule 608, Utah 
courts have consistently held that 
impeachment evidence is admissible 
if it goes to credibility, even 
though it introduces evidence which 
would be otherwise inadmissible." 
State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In Reed, the defendant had testified that he had told a witness 
that he did not use drugs, and this Court approved the prosecutor's 
subsequent inquiry of both the defendant and a third witness 
about drug paraphernalia found at the defendant's house. The 
Court observed that credibility was a crucial issue; first, the 
defendant's testimony had directly contradicted that of another 
witness. Second, the defendant's testimony directly attacked the 
character of another witness. Third, the defendant had denied the 
use of drugs, and the Court ruled that inquiring into the presence 
of drug paraphernalia in the defendant's house was permissible im-
peachment. 820 P.2d at 481. 
This case is factually identical to Reed. Burchett had 
testified that she did not use illegal drugs during her undercover 
assignment, and Farr's testimony had a direct bearing on her cre-
dibility on that point. In addition, in this case, the entire 
behavior of the police was the only issue before the jury, and 
Farr's testimony was monumentally important to the inquiry (T. 135). 
His evidence was manifestly much more than the general attack on 
credibility prohibited by Rule 608(b), State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), and was improperly excluded by the trial 
court. The error affected the substantial right of the Appellant 
to present his defense of entrapment, the only defense offered, and 
was therefore reversible, Utah R. Evid. 103(a), a proffer of the 
substance of Farr's testimony having been made on the record (T. 
133) . 
II. Constitutional Basis 
The trial court's exclusion of the testimony of defense 
witness Jeff Farr prevented Appellant from presenting his only 
defense witness, whose testimony had a direct bearing on the cre-
dibility of the undercover agent and upon the propriety of the 
police conduct in this case, the very issue raised by Appellant's 
defense of entrapment. Appellant was thus deprived of his fun-
damental right to present a witness in his defense, and the 
deprivation was of constitutional dimensions. Although the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the violation of an evidentiary stan-
dard is not in every case a constitutional deprivation, State v. 
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987), this Court is urged so 
to hold in this case. 
A. Due Process 
An early Utah case dealing with Art. I, §7 of our state 
Constitution observed: 
"Many attempts have been made to further 
define 'due process' but they all re-
solve into the thought that a party 
shall have his day in court — that is 
each party shall have the right to a 
hearing before a competent court, with 
the privilege of being heard and intro-
ducing evidence to establish his cause 
or defense, after which comes judg-
ment upon the record thus made." 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 
(Utah 1945). 
In the circumstances of this case, the language of Christensen 
is directly in point. Because Jeff Farr was the only defense 
witness other than hostile police officers, and because his 
testimony had a direct bearing on the credibility of the state's 
principal witness and upon the propriety of the conduct of the 
police, his exclusion as a witness prevented Appellant from 
having his "day in court," and denied Appellant the "privilege 
of being heard and introducing evidence to establish" his defense. 
The error in excluding Farr's testimony was therefore a denial of 
Appellant's right to due process guaranteed by Utah Const, art. I, 
§7. 
B. Right to Present Witnesses 
The language of Utah Const, art. I, §12 includes the 
right of the accused "to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf . . . " Implicit in this 
language is the right to present such witnesses at trial. No 
Utah case has dealt with this aspect of our Constitution, but 
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has recognized the right of 
a defendant to present witnesses in his defense as being based in 
a Maryland Constitutional provision similar to Utah's. In Brooks 
v. State, 560 A.2d 56 (Md. App. 1989), the court held that the 
trial court's erroneous exclusion of a defense witness who would 
have testified in a DUI case that the defendant was not driving the 
car amounted to a violation of the defendant's right under Article 
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to "present witnesses in 
his defense." 560 A.2d at 59. Article 21 of the Declaration of 
Rights under the Constitution of Maryland guarantees criminal de-
fendants the right "to have process for his witnesses; to 
examine the witnesses for and against him on oath . . . " 
This Court is invited to find the identical right to present 
witnesses in Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution, and to hold 
that this right cannot be abrogated by a statutory rule of evidence, 
nor by the erroneous application of such a rule as occurred in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant was entrapped into commission of the of-
fense for which he was convicted, and this Court should reverse 
the conviction. If the Court does not reverse on the entrapment 
issue, it should hold that the exclusion of the testimony of Jeff 
Farr was error affecting the substantial right of Appellant to 
present his defense, both as a matter of statutory and decisional 
law, as well as under the Constitution of the State of Utah. If 
the Court reverses on this ground, the case should be remanded to 
the District Court for a new trial on Count II of the Information. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JAY D. EDMONDS #957 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on August 31, 1992, I delivered four 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
APPENDIX 
Note: On January 23, 1992, a hearing was held on Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss Based on Entrapment in this case below. A 
similar hearing on a similar motion was heard at the same time 
in the case of State v. LeVasseur, since the same witnesses and 
the same counsel were involved in both cases. Both cases are 
now on appeal to this Court. State v. LeVasseur is assigned 
Case No. 920444-CA in this Court. The record on appeal in each 
case includes a separate transcript of the January 23, 1992 
entrapment hearings held in the District Court. In preparing 
these two separate transcripts, however, the reporter, for the 
sake of continuity and in conformity with the procedure followed 
by the trial judge in making his rulings, included the court's 
findings and conclusions on Appellant Martinez' motion only in 
the LeVasseur transcript; the Martinez entrapment hearing trans-
cript in the record in this case does not contain these findings 
and conclusions. An exact photocopy of that part of the LeVasseur 
entrapment hearing transcript which contains the Martinez findings 
and conclusions is therefore included in this Appendix. The 
original of these photocopied pages is in the original transcript 
on file in this Court under Case No. 920444-CA. 
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MR. BURNS: Okay- Moore and Belt are 1989 cases, and 
Moore and Belt cite the law in the state of Utah as being a 
normal or an average person. Five years newer than the 
Cripps case. I think the cite that counsel got came out of 
the right case, 744, but it's actually 692 P2d. 747. 
MR. EDMONDS: That was the cite that I gave the Court. 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
Well, as I indicated, I'd — I don't really think 
there's any dispute as to what the law is. It's been 
articulated now in several cases. All of which I've read. 
I think the law is that entrapment occurs when a law 
enforcement officer or person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with an officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for 
prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. I think that's what the law is, and I think 
that's what the courts have held. Conduct merely affording 
a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment. 
The focus of that section is whether the conduct 
of the police was such that it falls below proper standards 
for the proper use of government power. In other words, 
whether it comports with a fair and honorable administration 
of justice. And these cases all turn on their facts. 
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In Mr. Martinez' case, the facts, as I have them 
at this point, indicate that upon his first meeting with the 
undercover agent in November of 1990, he inquired as to 
whether she used coke and further told her about his having 
used coke the prior weekend. Their next discussion about 
coke was when she was at his house for dinner. She 
indicated that she had some customers that would like to 
obtain coke, and he came up with a suggestion that she could 
make a lot of money. That he had a contract in Vegas and 
could get her — get" her the cocaine from there. 
There were — is no evidence before me of any 
intimate relationship, although there is friendship. And 
the Moore case clearly holds that friendship alone is not 
enough. There must be more. There must be some 
inappropriate plea to the defendant's sympathy or to his 
passions through promises of sexual favors or through an 
ongoing sexual relationship. 
None of that occurred in this case. The agent 
didn't offer Mr. Martinez any large amounts of money. In 
fact, Mr. Martinez apparently profited little from these 
transactions, except that he may have had some aspirations 
for an improvement in the intimacy of their relationship. 
But the agent did nothing to encourage that, so far as the 
evidence indicates at this point. 
The relationship lasted from November to July, and 
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there was no sexual conduct, no offer of sexual conduct, and 
no promise of any sexual conduct in exchange for cocaine. 
The issue was raised as to whether or not there 
had been an appeal — an inappropriate appeal to the 
defendant — defendant's sympathies when the agent informed 
the defendant that her parents had been involved in an 
accident. I don't find that that was an attempt to appeal 
to his — his sympathies. Even if it was, the trip to 
Las Vegas for the second batch of cocaine had already been 
planned. They were "both going to go. He did not go simply 
because he'd been informed that her parents had been in an 
accident. He simply carried out the prearranged plan 
without her and brought the cocaine back to her. 
All in all, I find that the defendant was not 
entrapped. That none of the agent's conduct was such that 
would violate proper standards of use of governmental 
power. And that — I cannot find, as a matter of law, that 
he was entrapped. Although I understand that the issue can 
be reasserted before a jury, and they can make their own 
finding. The agent in this case merely provided an 
opportunity to commit the offense, and it was the defendant 
who appeared to be interested in — in cocaine, from the 
outset. 
Any questions? 
MR. EDMONDS: I have nothing. 
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